We test whether the composition of bank funding, and the share of deposit funding in particular, affects bank risk-taking and loan maturity. For identification, we exploit a tax reform in Italy that created incentives for households to hold deposits rather than bank bonds. Using geographically disaggregated data on deposits and securities from securities holdings statistics, we first show that the reform led to larger increases (decreases) in term deposits (bank bonds) in areas where households held more bank bonds prior to the reform. Next, relying on the comprehensive Italian Credit Register, we find that the change in funding led banks to increase the maturity of loans to non-financial firms. Moreover, consistent with theories about the role of the government safety net, we find that the effects on maturity and risk-taking are more pronounced for banks that experienced a larger increase in insured deposits.
Introduction
The financial crisis highlighted the importance of the composition of bank funding for financial stability and the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Banks with high reliance on interbank and wholesale funding came under severe pressure and were unable to continue lending to the real economy (Iyer, Peydró, da-Rocha-Lopes and Schoar, 2014; Cingano, Manaresi and Sette, 2016) .
1 As a consequence, recent post-crisis regulatory initiatives focus on the composition of banks' funding and a special role is attributed to deposits, as they are regarded as a stable source of funding, particularly during crises periods. 2 These developments are likely to modify banks' funding mix, increasing the weight of deposits relative to other funding sources such as bonds and interbank funding. Yet, there is little empirical evidence on how greater reliance on deposits may influence banks' lending policies, especially during a crisis.
Banks' funding structure is endogenous to their lending policies and the overall economic environment. This makes it very hard to obtain causal estimates on how a change in banks'
funding sources may influence lending and risk-taking. Moreover, investors behind different funding sources are also typically different. It is thus difficult to distinguish whether any observed differences are due to the intrinsic characteristics of the various funding sourcesembedded in their contractual characteristics and broader institutional framework that governs their use-or investor differences (e.g., retail versus institutional investors).
This paper takes advantage of a tax reform in Italy in September 2011 to study how changes in banks' funding mix within the same class of investors affected bank lending policies.
The reform eliminated a tax disadvantage in the treatment of household deposits over other privately issued securities held by households, inducing a shock in the supply of deposits and bonds from households. The reform altered the bank retail funding mix significantly: within two years from the reform, bond funding went down from 23% to 17% of bank assets, while retail deposits increased from 41% to 46% of bank assets. In terms of nominal amounts, the reshuffling from bonds to deposits after the reform amounts to about €100 billion (Panel A of Figure 1 ).
This shock allows us to study how the reform affected banks' funding mix, credit availability, loan maturity, and willingness to lend to riskier borrowers.
1 Many view the 2007-09 financial crisis as a run on wholesale funding (Afonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2011; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Covitz, Liang and Suarez, 2013) . Shocks to interbank liquidity may have negative real effects also in non-financial crisis times (Khawja and Mian 2008; Schnabl, 2012) . 2 One of the pillars of the Basel III is the net stable funding ratio, which requires banks to hold a certain fraction of their liabilities from "stable sources of funding", whose key component are retail deposits.
Economic theory and the existing empirical literature offer conflicting predictions as to how a shift from bonds to deposits may affect banks' lending policies. Deposits and bonds are not perfect substitutes -even when investors behind them are the same (e.g., households).
Deposits are a demandable, first-come-first serve, contract. Bonds are not: once issued, banks' funding is secured till maturity. The demandable nature of deposits exposes banks to liquidity risk and bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and serves as an incentive scheme to monitor and discipline banks (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001) . 3 Greater reliance on deposits as opposed to bonds may thus limit bank risk-taking or incentivize banks to originate more short-term loans. On the other hand, deposits enjoy stronger explicit and implicit government guarantees than bonds. They may thus offer banks a cheaper, more stable, and less risk sensitive funding source than bonds. If deposits are stable and "sleepy", banks may instead act as "patient" investors holding illiquid, long-term loans (Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny, 2015) . Stronger explicit and implicit government guarantees associated with deposits may also increase banks' risk-taking (Merton, 1977) . It is thus ex ante unclear how a shift from bond to deposit funding may impact banks' lending policies.
The Italian tax reform offers a unique opportunity to study how a greater reliance on deposits may influence banks' lending in periods of intense economic uncertainty. The analysis combines three detailed micro-level datasets: detailed data on deposit volume at the bankprovince level, information on bank bonds held by households at the security-level from the Securities Holding Statistics, and information on bank-firm credit from the Italian Credit
Register. All three datasets are held at the Bank of Italy.
We first identify the impact of the reform on banks' deposit and bond funding, using a differences-in-differences specification exploiting within bank-time variation arising from preexisting geographical heterogeneity in bank presence and household portfolios. That is, we compare changes in deposits of the same bank over the same period across different provinces.
Our key identifying assumption is that, all else equal, banks with branches in provinces where households held larger volumes of bank bonds prior to the reform experienced larger supply shocks to their deposit base. We find that banks with branches in areas where, prior to the reform, households held larger volumes of bank bonds experienced larger increases in deposit and larger drops in bond funding from households. Increases in household deposits are confined to term deposits. We instead do find not any significant increases on demand deposits, suggesting that households view term deposits as a closer substitute to bonds than demand deposits. Placebo tests on firms, whose tax treatment was not influenced by the reform, yield no significant effects.
This lends internal validity to our identification strategy as it suggests that our estimates are unlikely to be biased by contemporaneous confounding factors that may be affecting household deposits over this period. This is very important as the reform takes place during a period of intense volatility and pressure on the banking sector. Additionally, we find that banks with higher dependence on bonds prior to the form increase deposits more. Interestingly, we also find that riskier (banks with lower capital and worse credit portfolios) were able to increase their termdeposits more.
We then aggregate the estimates in the first step of the analysis into a bank-level instrument which we use to trace the impact of changes in banks' funding mix due to the reform on banks' lending policies. 4 Identification of the effect of the change in banks' funding mix on their lending policies is obtained using within firm-time variation as in Khwaja and Mian (2008) .
This allows us to control for contemporaneous changes in credit demand and firm specific preferences for long-term maturity loans. We find that banks that experienced larger increases in term deposits are willing to lend more long-term (loans with maturities longer than 5 years).
In terms of magnitudes, our differences-in-differences estimates suggest that, on average, an extra percentage point in the share of term deposits over bonds leads to an increase in the share of long-term loans to a given firm by 0.5 percentage points. This is a sizable increase considering that the average share of long-term loans is about 22% of total loans over the period. We also find that banks that experience larger increases in term deposits are willing to grant more credit to riskier firms. An extra percentage point of deposits as opposed to bonds leads to 1.3 percent increase in loans to riskier firms. Moreover, results on maturity and risk are twice as large for banks that experienced larger increases in insured deposits. Overall, our findings indicate that an increase in retail deposits will increase banks' ability to continue lending in crisis periods and act as "patient" investors proving illiquid, long-term loans. Consistent with the view in Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny (2015) their ability to do so draws on the government safety net and comes at the cost of greater risk-taking.
The observed changes in banks' funding mix are unlikely to be driven by an alternative 'flight to safety' explanation (whereby households move their portfolios away from risky and potentially illiquid securities such as bank bonds into safer and liquid deposits). Several pieces of evidence are inconsistent with this explanation. First, the observed reshuffling of banks' funding mix is not observed in other European countries such as Spain and Portugal that were also potentially affected by flight to safety considerations over this period. Second, a flight to safety explanation is more consistent with an increase in demand deposits rather than in term deposits as we find. Third, term deposits increase very sharply right after the reform, while they are completely flat before, despite significant increases in bank risk, as reflected in bank credit swap spreads, which widened as early as June 2011. Fourth, the placebo test on firms does not yield any significant treatment effects. Fifth, we find that the increase in deposits is larger for riskier, not safer, banks as a flight to safety explanation would predict.
Our findings complement and expand several strands of the extant literature. The literature on market discipline and bank runs investigates the role of deposits and other form of short-term debt in disciplining the bank (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer, Puri, and Ryan, 2016) . Differently from these papers, we do not study depositors' behavior during bank run episodes, but rather we examine the effects of a system-wide shock to the composition of bank liabilities on the composition of risk and maturity on the asset side.
More recently some papers have studied the importance of bank retail deposits for monetary policy (Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl, 2017) , especially under negative rates (Heider, Saidi and Schepens, 2017) . These papers study the role of deposits as a transmission channel for monetary policy and risk-taking, but yet little is known about the effects that a higher share of deposit funding per se has on bank lending and risk-taking. We also contribute to the literature analyzing the integration of local credit markets through the bank branch network (Plosser, 2014; Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Bustos, Garber and Ponticelli, 2017 ). On a more general level, our findings relate to works studying the complementarity between lending and deposit taking (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002) .
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Finally, an emerging literature examines the effects of tax shocks on bank lending. Schepens (2016) exploits the elimination of the tax deductibility of interest rates on corporate debt in Belgium in 2006 to study the effects on bank capital structure. 6 Célérier, Kick and Ongena 5 Choudary and Limodio (2017) exploit a natural experiment in Pakistan (Sharia levy) to study the effects of bank deposit volatility on loan maturities and rates. Differently from our paper they examine a change in the second moment (volatility) of a bank liability and its interaction with costly liquidity provision from the central bank. 6 Bond, Ham, Maffini, Nobili and Ricotti (2016) and Gambacorta, Ricotti, Sundaresan and Wang (2016) examine a similar question on bank capital structure using cross-sectional variation in corporate taxes across Italian provinces.
(2017) also use changes in the deductibility of interest rates in several European countries to analyze the effects of an increase in capital ratios on credit supply. Our paper is different from these because the tax reform we analyze affects households directly and banks only indirectly through household holdings of bonds and deposits. Moreover the Italian tax reform induces a change in the composition of liabilities from bonds to deposits, not in capital ratios. Finally, we explicitly examine the effects of the change in bank funding mix on risk-taking incentives and maturity on the lending side.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the tax reform and its aggregate effects on the Italian banking system. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 explains our identification strategy and reports our key findings on banks' deposit and bond funding. Section 5 explains our identification strategy on banks' credit policies and reports and discusses our main findings. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
The tax reform
As the sovereign debt crisis intensified in the summer of 2011 and yields on Italian sovereign bonds surged, the Italian government passed an emergency budget law to increase government revenues and reduce its deficit. One of the provisions of the accompanied budget law eliminated the asymmetry in the tax treatment of deposits over other securities that had been part of the Italian tax code since the early 1990s. Prior to the reform, interest income on deposits was subject to a 27% withholding tax rate whereas interest income and dividends from all other securities, including both corporate and sovereign bonds, were taxed at 12.5%. As a consequence, Italian banks used to sell bank bonds, rather than term deposits, directly to households. The reform harmonized the tax treatment of deposits and all private sector securities at 20%. Sovereign bonds, both domestic and foreign, maintained their lower 12.5% tax rate. The new tax rates came in effect in January 2012, but were first announced in August 2011 and approved in September 2011. Importantly, these changes applied only to households and not firms. 7 Table 1 summarizes the tax rates by asset class before and after the reform.
(Insert Table 1 Importantly, the reform also shocked banks' funding sources by inducing a positive supply shock to bank deposits and a negative supply shock to bond financing. All else equal, the changes in the tax code made bank deposits (private sector securities) more ( billion to €462 billion). Term deposits instead more than tripled (from about €33 billion to €123 billion). This suggests that households viewed term deposits as a closer substitute to bank bonds than demand deposits. This is not surprising as bank bonds are primarily held by households for investment purposes and as a mean of storing excess income for future consumption. The closest substitute to bonds among deposit products are term deposits. Demand deposits are primarily held for liquidity purposes to facilitate current consumption. This is also reflected in interest rates. For example, in the year prior to the announcement of the reform, the average annual gross interest rate on household demand deposits to households was about 0.36%. Household term deposits instead payed on average 2.27% per annum, which is more comparable to the 3.81% average yield of bank bonds held by households. Moreover, in the year after the reform, the average rate of term deposits increased to 2.97% while the one on bonds decreased to 3.68%. Thus, all else equal, the change in the tax rate decreased the tax advantage of bonds over deposits by about 111 basis points, from 1.68% to 0.57%.
Overall, these patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that the tax reform created a positive supply shock to bank deposits and a negative supply shock to bond financing, leading to a substitution of bond financing with term deposits and possibly a short-lived substitution of demand deposits with term deposits. There could be, however, other factors that may have contributed to this reshuffling. For example, the reform coincides with the sovereign debt crisis.
It is therefore possible that the observed reshuffling from bonds to deposits is driven by a general 'flight to quality', whereby Italian households move their portfolio away from risky and potentially illiquid securities (bank bonds) and into liquid deposits. This seems unlikely, however, as a similar reshuffling is not observed in other European countries, such as Spain and Portugal, that experience similar banking pressures during the sovereign crisis (see Figure 1A in the Appendix). Moreover, a 'flight to safety' explanation will be more consistent with an increase in demand deposits rather than in term deposits, as we discussed above.
There could be, however, other factors that may have affected banks' funding, such as liquidity interventions from the European Central Bank (ECB) over the same period. 10 Hence, in what follows, we propose an identification strategy that is geared to absorb such confounding factors by exploiting within bank-time variation in the intensity of the shock arising from preexisting geographical heterogeneity in bank presence and household portfolios.
Data and summary statistics
The empirical analysis relies on three main datasets: i) a dataset on deposit volumes at the bankprovince level, ii) a dataset on bank bonds held by households at the bank-province level from the Securities Holding Statistics (SHS), and iii) the Italian Credit Register. These three main datasets are merged and complemented with additional bank and firm information from accounting statements of banks and non-financial borrowing firms. All datasets are available at the Bank of Italy (Italy's central bank and bank supervisor).
At the end of each month, banks report to the Bank of Italy the amount of deposits they obtain from households and non-financial firms, broken down by type of deposits (demand or term deposits), and province of residence. Data coverage is complete and is available for about 600 banks (banking groups) across 110 provinces. 11 Information by size of deposit account is available with less granularity i.e., at the bank-level and at an annual frequency. Data reporting distinguishes between three size categories: accounts below €50,000, accounts between €50,000 and €250,000, and accounts above €250,000. The accounts in the first size category are fully insured, accounts in the second category are partially insured, while those in the third are fully uninsured.
12
Information on bank bonds is obtained from the SHS. The SHS covers the securities issued, held and traded by euro area residents broken down by holder sector and province of residence at a quarterly frequency as of 2008. The data are at the security level (ISIN) and are obtained directly from the banks that manage securities on behalf of clients (acting as "custodians"). We use the SHS to track the volume of bonds issued by Italian banks and held by households at the bank-province level and to construct a measure of banks' exposure based on their geographical presence and households' holdings of bank bonds prior to the reform.
Data on credit to Italian nonfinancial firms is obtained from the Italian Credit Register ("Centrale dei Rischi", CR). CR is maintained by the Bank of Italy and collects information,
from all intermediaries operating nationwide, on individual borrowers with an outstanding exposure of over €30000 with a single intermediary. 13 The credit registry allows to track the amount of credit granted or disbursed (drawn) to each borrower from each institution by loan type (credit lines, term loans, and loans backed by account receivables) and maturity class (less than 1 year, between 1 year and 5 years, and longer than 5 years). For identification purposes, our sample includes firms that have loans granted (drawn or not) from at least two banks. This yields a sample of around 378,000 bank-firm relationships to about 116,000 firms. Multiple lending is a structural characteristic of bank-firm relationships in Italy (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000; Gobbi and Sette, 2014) . Hence, restricting the sample to firms borrowing from at least two banks entails a limited loss of generality in this case. In fact, out of the total credit given to the corporate sector, the share of credit given to firms that borrow from at least two banks is about 85%.
11 Italy is divided in 20 regions and each region is further subdivided into provinces, each surrounding a large city. The number of provinces has been between 107 and 110 in the period 2005-2016. In term of population, Italian provinces are about the size of US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). For example, in 2012 Italian provinces had an average (median) population of 544,000 (377,000), similar to corresponding figures for US MAs at 660,000 (200,000), respectively (2010 US Census Bureau). 12 The deposit insurance limit in Italy is harmonized with the rest of the European Union at €100.000 per account. 13 The €30,000 threshold applies as of December 2008. The information in the credit registry includes the identity of the granting institution and the identity (unique tax identifier) of the borrowing firm. This allows merging the registry with additional bank and firm information from accounting data. Accounting bank-level information for banks (such as bank size, capital levels, funding source, and nonperforming loans) is obtained from accounting statements submitted by individual banks and banking groups to the Bank of Italy for supervision. Information on borrowing firms in the CR is obtained from accounting statements deposited at Cerved. 14 Data on other province characteristics such as population and GDP as of 2012 are obtained from Census data by the National Statistical Office (ISTAT).
Our sample covers the period between December 2009 and December 2013 (i.e., 2 years before to 2 years after the reform). Panel A of Table 2 provides an overview of key bank characteristics at the beginning of the sample period. Household deposits are banks' single largest funding source, followed by bank bonds, equity and interbank funding. Household deposits are on average about 32.4% of total assets. (By way of comparison, deposits of nonfinancial firms are only about 5.9% of total assets.) In terms of size, deposits are equally split in each of the three size categories, each representing roughly one third of total deposits. Bank bonds to total assets are about 22.5%. Equity is on average 11.8% of total assets and interbank deposits are about 4% of total assets. There is, however, significant variation across banks in terms of funding sources. There is also significant variation with respect to bank size. The average value of total assets is €6.8 billion, ranging between €5 million to €1.26 trillion.
(Insert Table 2 about here) Panels B and C of Table 2 report summary statistics of variables used to estimate our empirical specifications. We return to these below when we discuss our models.
Identification strategy and results: bank deposits and bonds

Identification strategy
To estimate the impact of the reform on banks' deposit and bond funding, we rely on disaggregated deposit and bank bond data at the bank-province level. Using bank-province information, as opposed to bank-level information, allows us to employ a differences-indifferences analysis and evaluate the impact of the reform on deposits, controlling for economy-wide and bank-level shocks. Identification of the treatment effect of interest is obtained by comparing the growth rate in household (total, demand, and term) deposits within the same bank before and after the reform across different provinces. We follow a similar approach for bonds.
We hypothesize that, all else equal, the reform led to a larger increase (decrease) in the supply of deposits (bonds) in provinces where households held larger volumes of bank bonds i.e., in provinces where there were more funds to be reshuffled. Information about the holdings of bank bonds of Italian households by province of residence is obtained from the SHS. More formally,
we estimate the following difference-in-difference specification:
where Δ log ( ) , , denotes the growth rate in (total, demand, and term) household deposits of bank b in province p before and after the reform ( = 0, 1, respectively The inclusion of bank-time fixed effects absorbs economy-wide and bank-level shocks that may influence banks' average deposits growth during the event window. The coefficient of interest is . All else equal, we expect that the reform led to a larger positive shock on the supply of deposits in provinces where prior to the reform households held larger volumes of bank bonds.
We thus expect that > 0.
Provinces where households hold larger volumes of bank bonds tend to be larger and richer, i.e., they account for a larger fraction of GDP and have larger populations (Figure 2 ). The inclusion of province fixed-effects, , is thus important as it absorbs time-invariant province characteristics that may correlate with the average growth rate of deposits in a province and household portfolio allocations (e.g., the overall economic and financial development of a province, demographic characteristics of households such as education and financial literacy).
Given our narrow event window, such characteristics can be considered time-invariant.
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
We use similar specifications to Eqn.
(1) to evaluate the impact of the reform on bank bonds and the bank's debt financing mix between deposits and bonds by replacing the dependent variable in Eqn.
(1) with Δ log( ) , , and ∆ ( /( + )) , , , respectively. All else equal, we expect that the reform led to a larger negative shock to the supply of bonds and thus a large increase in banks' reliance on deposit-to-bond funding in provinces where households held larger volumes of bank bonds before the reform.
As it can be observed in Panel B of Table 2 , there is significant variation in the sample in the growth rates of both deposits and bonds across banks and provinces. For example, the average growth rate of term deposits of households ranges from -19.5% to 33.6%, with mean of 1.8% and a standard deviation of 4.7% (2.6 times larger than its mean). Similarly, the growth rate of bank bonds held by households ranges between -28.3% and 28.7%, with a mean value of -0.4% and a standard deviation of 6.5%. Households' holdings of bank bonds prior to the reform are also very heterogeneous across provinces, with ,2009 ranging between 0.02% and 9%.
Parallel trends assumption
The internal validity of Eqn.
(1) rests on the assumption that in the absence of treatment (the tax reform in our case), the difference in deposit volumes in 'high' and 'low' bond provinces is constant over time, known as the parallel trends assumption. Visual inspection of deposit volumes in high and low bond provinces prior to the reform, can offer some confidence as to whether this assumption is likely to hold. Figure 3 reports the average deposits volumes in provinces with above and below median ,2010 values, respectively. We report separate graphs for total, demand, and term deposits. The red vertical line indicates the reform's approval date (September 2011). Figure 3 confirms with confidence that, at least for term deposits, the parallel trends assumption is likely to be satisfied in this case. Before the reform, term deposits in high and low bond provinces are very stable and move in parallel trends. Results are less clearcut for demand and total deposits. Both demand and total deposits exhibit downward trends that are a little more pronounced for provinces with ex-ante high bond holdings.
(Insert Figure 3 about here) Table 3 offers a formal statistical test (paired sample t-tests) of the differences in average growth rates of deposits prior to the reform between the two groups. Consistent with the visual inspection of Figure 3 , we find that prior to the reform there is no statistically significant difference in the growth rate of term deposits between the two. Differences in the average growth rates of total and demand deposits prior to the reform between high and low bond provinces are not statistically significant. Table 2 offers similar tests for all other dependent variables of Eqn.
(1). Consistent with the parallel trends assumption, we find no statistically significant differences in the average growth rates of bonds (Δ log( ) , , ) and deposits to bond ratios (∆ ( /( + )) , , ) between the two groups.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
To further evaluate the internal validity of Eqn.
(1), we also examine whether our identification strategy identifies a positive treatment effect where there should be none (placebo test). As mentioned earlier, the tax changes apply only to households, not firms. We thus reestimate our model by replacing the dependent variable in Eqn.
(1) with corresponding variables for the growth rate in (total, demand, and term) deposits of non-financial firms. Table 4 reports our baseline findings for deposits. We report results for total, demand, and term deposits of both households and non-financial firms. For each dependent variable, we report two specifications: one with bank fixed-effects and one with bank-time fixed-effects. For the former, we can include a dummy to estimate average trend in deposits after the reform, , to examine whether on average deposits are increasing over this period.
Results on bank deposits
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Consistent with unconditional results in Figure 3 , we find that the reform increased the growth rate of term deposits of households more in areas where prior to the reform households held more bank bonds. In terms of economic significance, these estimates indicate that a 1-standard deviation increase in ,2009 (i.e., by 1.2 percentage points) leads to an additional increase in the time averaged monthly growth rate of household term deposits by 0.13% to 0.22%, depending on the specification (columns 5 and 6). This is a sizable effect considering that the average monthly growth rate of term deposits after the reform at the bank-province level (the coefficient of in column 5) is about 0.8%. 17 Consistent with unconditional results, we find no significant differences in the growth rate of total deposits; demand deposits appear to be falling more in high bond areas (columns 1 to 4). This suggests that perhaps households have also substituted demand deposits for term deposits, though to a limited extent. The estimated treatment effect is smaller in size and the statistical significance of the interaction term is not robust to changes in the event window.
To further evaluate the internal validity of our identification strategy, we estimate similar specifications for non-financial firms, whose tax rates were not affected by the reform. We find no significant treatment effects. The coefficients of the interaction terms between ,2009 and the dummy are close to zero and never statistically significant (columns 7 to 12). This makes it unlikely that our treatment estimates are driven by contemporaneous economy-wide trends affecting bank deposits, such as a general 'flight to safety'.
In Table A2 in the Appendix we estimate corresponding specifications in levels by replacing the dependent variable with ( ) , , . Results are very similar with baseline specifications in Table 4 . We find a positive treatment effect for term deposits of households and no significant change for non-financial firms. We also find a positive treatment effect for total deposits of households (column 1 of Table A2 ). Hence, although the reform did not change the growth rates of total deposits differentially between high and low bond provinces it did lead to a differential increase in the level of total deposits, consistent with unconditional results in Panel A of Figure 3 . In terms of economic significance, we find that a 1-standard deviation increase in ,2009 leads to an additional increase in term (total) deposits by about 3% (1.8%).
17 In robustness analysis, reported in Table A1 in the Appendix, we confirm this key finding to augmented specifications of Eqn.
(1) that allow for economic and demographic province characteristics, such as GDP and population, to respond differently to the reform by interacting these characteristics with the dummy (column 1). Similar results are also obtained if we allow for region-specific shocks by introducing interaction terms between the reform dummy and dummy variables for each of the 20 regions where provinces are grouped, × (column 2). Results are also robust to the exclusion the three largest provinces by bond holdings (Milan, Rome, and Turin), provinces with term deposits less than €500,000 (75 th percentile), and all cooperative banks, which tend to be small and regional (columns 3-5).
In Table 5 we investigate which banks experienced larger increases in household deposits after the reform. We find that it is especially banks that had a higher dependence on bank bonds prior to the reform that increase term deposits. This is intuitive insofar as these banks had to make up for larger negative shocks in bond financing, following the more unfavorable taxation of bonds going forward. In particular, we find that term deposits in the high bond provinces grow more than twice as fast for banks that had above median dependence on bond funding prior to the reform. In terms of annualized growth rate of term deposits, our estimates suggest that a 1-standard deviation increase in ,2009 translates into a difference of 2.1% for these banks, which is as large as the baseline effect. We also find that riskier banks (with higher nonperforming loans to total assets) experienced larger increases in term deposits. All else equal, bonds are a riskier investment than bonds. Deposits enjoy stronger government guarantees than bonds. Riskier banks should thus benefit more from this reshuffling. Consistent with this explanation, more capitalized banks (with higher equity to total assets) have a negative treatment effect. We do not find any significant heterogeneity in the size of the treatment effect with respect to interbank funding and with respect to total or demand deposits.
(Insert Table 5 
Results on bank bonds and bank funding mix between deposits and bonds
In Table 6 we evaluate the impact of the reform on bank bonds and banks' financing mix between deposits and bonds. We find that, in the same areas where banks experienced a higher growth rate of term deposits after the reform, the growth rate of bank bonds is significantly lower. The estimates imply that a 1-standard deviation increase in ,2009 is associated with 0.24% lower annualized growth rate in bank bonds, which is about 1/10 of the annual growth rate in bank bonds at the bank-province level (column 1). A potential concern with these estimates is that the level of the bank's own bonds in 2009, which is included in the construction of ,2009 , may induce a negative correlation with the growth rate of the bank's own bonds (acting like a lagged dependent variable). To evaluate whether this influences our estimates, we compute the amount of bank bonds held by households in the province, excluding the bank's own bonds ( Results are unchanged (column 2).
(Insert Table 6 about here)
Turning to the bank's financing mix between deposits and bonds, we find that consistent with our earlier findings on deposits and bonds, the reform led to an increase in the banks' reliance on banks' deposits funding as opposed to bonds. The share of deposits over the sum of deposits and bonds is also increasing overall in the high bond areas, both for term deposits and total deposits (see columns 7 and 3, respectively). Corresponding specifications with higher frequency data reveal that the impact of the reform on the bank's financing mix dies-off at around one year after the reform (Panel B of Figure 4 ).
Identification strategy and results: bank lending
Identification strategy
In the second part of the analysis, we trace the impact of the reform on banks' lending policies.
We use the estimates from the bank-province analysis of Eqn. (1) to construct an instrument for the change in the bank's financing mix between bonds and deposits at the bank-level and trace its impact on banks' credit availability, loan maturity, and willingness to lend to riskier borrowers using a differences-in-differences specification as in Khwaja and Mian (2008) . The identification of the treatment effect is obtained using within-firm variation by comparing changes in the credit outcomes of the same firm across banks that are differentially affected by the treatment. This helps control for possible contemporaneous changes in credit demand. Importantly, we also address the concerns that different banks may specialize in different loan types, thus violating the Khwaja-Mian (2008) assumption that demand for credit by firms is unrelated to bank characteristics (see, for example, Paravisini, Rappoport and Schnabl, 2017) . Indeed, the core of our analysis is precisely a test of the effect of a change in the deposit/bond mix on the supply of different types of loans (e.g., long-term loans versus short-term loans) by different banks.
More formally, we evaluate the impact of the reform on credit availability using the following differences-in-differences specification:
where ∆log( ) , denotes the growth rate in total credit of bank to firm before and after the reform. 18 ( + ) denotes the change in the financing mix between deposits and bonds of bank b over the same period, constructed in a similar way as ∆log( ) .
,2009 is a vector of bank characteristics that may influence banks growth rate of deposits. It includes bond, equity as well as interbank financing to total assets and a set of dummies for each decile of bank assets (bank-size fixed effects), all predetermined as of December 2009. denotes firm fixed-effects and , denotes the idiosyncratic error-term.
Eqn. (2) is estimated for the sub-sample of firms with multiple bank-lending relationship.
The coefficient of interest, , is identified by comparing how the growth rates of credit to the same firm varies across banks whose term deposits versus bond financing was differentially affected by the reform. To isolate the increase in banks' deposits over bonds induced by the reform, we instrument ∆ ( /( + )) using the output of Eqn.
(1) with ∆ ( /( + )) , , as the dependent variable.
To obtain a bank-level instrument we aggregate across provinces as follows: 18 To construct the dependent variable, we collapse and average the amount of credit granted to a firm in the twelve months before the announcement of the reform and in the twelve months after the reform came in effect (excluding again the last quarter of 2011). We then take the difference between the natural logarithms of the two values.
To evaluate the impact of the reform on loan maturity we replace the dependent variable in Eqn. (2) with ∆( > 5 ) , -a variable that measures the change in the banks' share of longer maturity loans (greater than 5 years) to the firm as fraction of the bank's total credit to the firm. 19 We explore whether the increase in deposits leads to an increase in loans to riskier firms using an augmented specification of Eqn. (2) that allows for interactions between
) and -a dummy variable that equals one for riskier firms (with an Altman z-score above 7 prior to the reform), and equals zero otherwise (see Rodano, Serrano-Velarde and Tarantino, 2017) . Using triple interactions, we also explore whether increases in credit to riskier firms are more pronounced for banks with more fully insured deposits (banks with larger ratios of deposits below €50,000 as fraction of total deposits).
Panel C of Table 2 reports summary statistics for variables used to estimate Eqn. (2). Table 7 reports our findings with respect to credit availability and loan maturity. For comparison we always report OLS results using the actual changes in the bank's funding mix as the key explanatory variable (columns 1-2 and 5-6) as well as instrumental variable (IV) results using the output of our bank-province analysis as an instrument (columns 3-4 and 7-8). We construct our instrument using Eqn. (3) and estimates from column (7) of Table 6 .
Results: credit availability, loan maturity, and risk-taking
(Insert Table 7 about here)
Both the OLS and the IV estimates indicate that the greater reliance on term deposits led to an increase in the bank's total credit granted and share of long-term loans to the same firm.
Results with respect to total credit granted are statistically weaker and not always significant.
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In terms of economic significance, our IV estimates indicate that a 1-standard deviation increase in ∆( /( + )) (1.1 percentage points) leads to an increase in the share of longterm loans to the firm by 0.2-0.5 percentage points, which is about the average change over the period. This is a sizable increase considering that the average share of long-term loans is about 22% of total loans over the period. The OLS estimates are smaller than the IV estimates, 19 In additional robustness checks, we also consider the share of 5 year loans as a fraction of total term loans to the firm, excluding credit lines. Contractual maturity for credit lines may be quite different from effective maturity, depending on when the borrower draws on the credit line. 20 In robustness tests in Table A3 , the result on total credit is found not to be robust to the exclusion of cooperative banks from the sample, while the extension of loan maturity is still strong and statistically significant. Similarly, in Table A4 , when we calculate the increase in banks' financing mix using total deposits, rather than term deposits, we again find no significant coefficient for total credit, but a positive effect on loan maturity.
suggesting that endogenous changes in term deposits over the same period impose a downward bias on estimates of the treatment effect. In all cases the instrument is strong, as the 1 st stage Fstat is well above ten-the common rule of thumb to gauge the strength of the instrument.
The observed increase in loan maturity is consistent with predictions in Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny (2015) who argue that more deposits provide greater funding stability and enable banks to act as "patient lenders" by investing more in illiquid long-term loans. Another key prediction in Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny (2015) is that the effects on loan maturity should be more pronounced for banks with more insured deposits. If depositors enjoy government guarantees, they can be "sleepy" and not care about asset value fluctuations. For this reason, banks would find optimal to invest in illiquid, long-term assets. Others argue (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991) that banks with more deposit should be less risky, as the threat of bank runs acts as a market discipline device.
We test for these channels in Table 8 . We find that, if the bank increased the amount of insured deposits after the reform (a dummy equal to one if the share of deposits below €50,000 increases after the reform), then the increase in maturity following an increase in funding is more than twice as large as in the baseline (columns 7 and 10). We again find no significant effect on total credit granted, even for the banks that increased the share of insured deposits after the reform (columns 1 and 4). Moreover, consistent with the predictions in Calomiris and Kahn (1991), we find that banks that increased funding from deposits reduce risk-taking by committing less credit to risky borrowers (column 5). The effects are more pronounced if we allow the impact of funding to be heterogeneous for insured deposits: banks reduce risk-taking only if the increase in deposits is above €50,000, while they actually increase risk-taking if insured deposits increase (column 6). Importantly, we find that the increase in maturity is not more pronounced for risky firms and for banks with a higher increase in insured deposits lending to risky firms (columns 8-9 and columns 11-12). This suggests that the increase in maturity is not driven by an increase in risk-taking for the banks that have a higher share of deposit funding, but rather it is the result of the increased stability of funding coming from deposits.
(Insert Table 8 about here)
Finally, we explore bank heterogeneity of the effects of the change in the funding mix for credit and maturity in Table 9 . In particular, we interact the change in the funding mix for dummy variables based on median bank characteristics in 2009, prior to the reform, as in Table   5 . We first interact the change in funding independently with the variables that were more significantly associated with the increase in deposits at the local level: the dependence on bond funding (columns 1, 4, 7 and 10) and the share of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total assets (columns 2, 5, 8 and 11). We find that especially banks with more NPLs over assets are able to increase total lending and maturity, rather than those with more bond funding prior to the reform.
When we introduce all bank interactions jointly in the same regression (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12)
we still find that banks with more NPLs are able to increase maturity, but not total credit.
These results are interesting because they indicate that riskier banks with bad legacy assets are those that benefit the most from the increased stability of deposits and are able to extend credit with longer maturity.
(Insert Table 9 about here)
Conclusions
Banks are special because they combine short-term, money-like securities (deposits) on the liability side with long-term, potentially illiquid assets (loans). That is, banks engage in maturity transformation. A large and well established theoretical literature argues that banks derive synergies from the maturity mismatch (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Diamond and Rajan 2001; Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002) . Recently, the discussion has evolved around the role of retail deposits as a transmission channel for monetary policy (Dreschsler, Savov and Schnabl, 2017; Heider, Saidi and Schepens, 2017) . We study the effects of a shock to the composition of bank funding, which increased the share of term deposits from households on bank lending, for risktaking and maturity.
Our results are thus informative about the debate on the stability of retail deposit funding versus other forms of debt (in particular, bonds). In fact, even though deposits are liquid and runnable securities, they also enjoy higher government guarantees. If the second effect dominates, deposits represent a stable funding source for banks that can be "patient" and lend more in long-term, illiquid assets (Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny, 2015) . The results we find are consistent with the latter view: banks that increase deposit funding over bonds after the reform are able to increase the maturity of loans, especially if they increased the amount of insured deposits. Banks that increased insured deposits also lend more to ex-ante riskier firms.
More broadly, our results provide support for liquidity regulation under Basel III that requires banks to hold enough stable funding to finance long-term assets (the Net Stable Funding Table 4 . The Effect of the Reform on Bank Deposits
This table provides the estimates for the effect of the reform on bank deposits (equation (1)). The dependent variable in all specifications is the time averaged monthly log-change in deposits at bank b in province p in twelve months before the announcement of the reform (September 2010 to September 2011) and the twelve months after the reform came in effect (January 2012 to December 2012 . The first six columns analyze household deposits and the last six firm deposits (for a placebo test). In columns (1) - (2) and (7) - (8) the dependent variable is the growth rate of total deposits, in column (3) - (4) and (9) - (10) the dependent variable is the growth rate of demand deposits and finally in columns (5) - (6) and (11) - (12) are dummies equal to one if bank b is above the median in the following characteristic: bond funding over total assets, Nonperforming loans (NPLs) over total assets, equity over total assets and interbank funding over total assets in 2009, 0 otherwise. In columns (1) - (2) the dependent variable is the growth rate of total deposits, while column (3) - (4) and (5) - (6) This table provides the estimates for the effect of the change in bank funding due to the reform on credit and loan maturity (equation (2)). The dependent variable in columns (1) - (4) is the log-change in the time averaged amount of credit granted from bank b to firm f twelve months before the announcement of the reform (September 2010 to September 2011) and the twelve months after the reform came in effect (January 2012 to December 2012). In columns (5) - (8) (1) - (6) is the log-change in the time averaged credit granted from bank b to firm f twelve months before and after the reform (see Table 7 ). The dependent variable is columns (7) - (12) is the change in the share of long-term loans (i.e., above 5 years maturity) over total credit by bank b to firm f twelve months before after the reform. ∆ /( + ) is the time averaged change in the share of term deposits over term deposits plus bonds of bank b twelve months after the reform. ℎ 50 is a dummy equal to one if bank b increases the share of total deposits below €50,000 (fully insured) between 2012 and 2011, 0 otherwise. is a dummy equal to one for firms with a z-score above 7, 0 otherwise. (1) - (6) is the log-change in average credit granted from bank b to firm f twelve months before and after the reform (see Table 7 ). The dependent variable is columns (7) - (12) is the change in the share of long-term loans (i.e., above 5 years maturity) over total credit by bank b to firm f twelve months before after the reform. ∆ is the time averaged change in the share of term deposits over term deposits plus bonds of bank b twelve months after the reform. This table provides robustness checks for the effect of the reform on term deposits introducing additional province characteristics and excluding potential outliers. The dependent variable is the average monthly growth rate of household term deposits at bank b in province p in the pre-and post-reform period (± 12 months from the reform -see Table 3 for further details). is a dummy equal to one for the post reform period and zero before. We interact ,2009 and ( ) ,2012 with the in column (1); include Region × fixed-effects (a region is a collection of provinces, there are 20 regions in Italy) in column (2); exclude the three largest provinces by bank bond holdings (Milan, Rome and Turin, with a combined share of 18.3% of total bank bonds in Italy) in column (3); exclude cooperative banks (around 400 banks) in column (4) This table provides robustness checks for the effect of the change in bank funding due to the reform on credit and loan maturity (equation (2)). The dependent variable in columns (1) - (4) ( (5) - (8)) is the log-change (change) in time averaged amount of credit granted (share of long-term loans, i.e. above 5 years maturity, over total loans) from bank b to firm f twelve months before the announcement of the reform (September 2010 to September 2011) and the twelve months after the reform came in effect (January 2012 to December 2012). In columns (9) - (12) we recalculate the share of long-term loans as a fraction of total term loans from bank b to firm f, excluding credit lines. In columns (1) - (8) we exclude cooperative banks from the sample. ∆ is the time averaged change in the share of term deposits over term deposits plus bonds of bank b twelve months after the reform. All bank controls are dated as of December 2009. We include bank-size fixed-effects as dummies for each decile of bank total assets. 1 st stage F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap statistic. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank and firm level. This table provides the estimates for the effect of the change in bank funding due to the reform on credit and loan maturity (equation (2)). The dependent variable in columns (1) -(4) ( (5) - (8)) is the log-change (change) in time averaged amount of credit granted (share of long-term loans, i.e. above 5 years maturity, over total loans) from bank b to firm f twelve months before the announcement of the reform (September 2010 to September 2011) and the twelve months after the reform came in effect (January 2012 to December 2012). ∆ is the time averaged change in the share of total deposits over total deposits plus bonds of bank b twelve months after the reform. All bank controls are dated as of December 2009. We include bank-size fixed-effects as dummies for each decile of bank total assets. 1 st stage F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap statistic. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank and firm level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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